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Este trabalho  examina a evolução da  ocupação  da fronteira agrícola no Brasil no século  19 
através de um arcabouço teórico que analisa a interação entre a ocupação de terra e a emergência 
de direitos de propriedade de facto antes do estabelecimento e garantia de direitos de proprieade 
de jure pelo governo. Neste arcabouço as rendas (rents) associadas com maior exclusividade 
inicialmente geram uma demanda por arranjos de propriedade comum, porém normas informais 
e  política  também  determinam  que  formas  organizacionais  surgirão.  Em  algum  momento 
escassez irá gerar uma demanda por exclusividade maior do que pode ser sustentado por arranjos 
informais de propriedade comum, e os ocupantes irão demandar direitos de propriedade de jure, 
ou  seja,  títulos  formais.  Conflitos  serão  reduzidos  quando  o  governo  alocar  os  direitos  de 
propriedade àqueles que ocuparam a terra primeiro. No entanto, esta alocação e a decisão de 
realmente policiar os direitos de propriedade de jure depende da existência de interesses políticos 
neste sentido.  
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Abstract 
This paper examines land settlement and conflict on the Brazilian frontier in the 19
th century. We 
are interested in the emergence, sustainability, and collapse of commons arrangements in specific 
historical  contexts. We  presents a conceptual framework to  better understand the interaction 
between  settlement  and  the  emergence  of  de  facto  property  rights  on  frontiers  prior  to 
governments  establishing and enforcing  de jure  property rights.  In this framework, potential 
rents associated with more exclusivity drives “demand” for commons arrangements but demand 
is not a sufficient explanation; norms and politics matter. At some point enhanced scarcity will 
drive demand for more exclusivity beyond which can be sustained with commons arrangements. 
Claimants will therefore petition government for de jure property rights to their claims – formal 
titles. Land conflict will be minimal when governments supply property rights to first possessors. 
But, governments may not allocate de jure rights to these claimants because they face differing 
political constituencies. 
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I.  Introduction   
We define the frontier as land that is too far from the central government such that the 
initial enforcement of property rights by government is prohibitively expensive.  We examine the 
way in which the extant specified property rights in each country affected settlement and in 
particular the potential and emergence of subsequent land conflict. Property rights, along with 
relative prices, provide the incentive for settlement and conflict on frontier lands. Property rights 
can be either de facto or de jure. By de facto we mean that the property rights are specified by 
first person (an individual claims the land) or second person (a group assigns rights or norms 
emerge) while de jure rights are specified by a government with recognized authority. Both de 
facto  and  de  jure  rights  may  be  enforced  by  first  person  (self-enforcement);  second  person 
(norms or rules of a group, club or association) or third party (private militias or government). 
When land is relatively abundant, informal de facto property rights may arise to limit dissipation, 
entice entrants, and yet avoid conflict. As land becomes scarcer, settlers have the incentive to 
form a commons arrangement to exclude outsiders and thereby limit the potential dissipation 
from the resource. As entrants become increasingly heterogeneous with respect to endowments, 
de facto commons arrangements may not suffice to limit dissipation, and  claimants have an 
incentive to lobby the government to turn their de facto claims into de jure property rights with 
government enforcement. But, the economic rents may not be sufficient for property rights to 
emerge because political rents may vary from the economic rents.  
Because  of  competing  demands  for  de  jure  rights  by  heterogeneous  claimants, 
governments may opt not to legitimate the de facto claims of the initial entrants yet they may not 
enforce the specified de jure rights of alternative claimants. We found that the greater the time 
between  the  specification  of  de  jure  property  rights  and  their  enforcement  the  greater  the 
potential for rent dissipation, particularly violence between those holding and enforcing de facto 
rights  and  those  with  specified  but  not  enforced  de  jure  rights.  The  determinants  of  the 
specification and enforcement of de jure property rights depends on the political power of the 
competing claimants. Where the political power of incumbents is high (Brazil) de jure rights will 
tend to support the de facto rights. Alternatively, where political power is mixed, such as in 
Australia and the U.S., the specification and enforcement of de jure rights may not coincide. 
Incumbents may retain de facto rights because of little enforcement by the government, but incur 
costs to prevent the de jure right holders from exercising their specified rights. The ability to 
retain de facto rights in the face of someone else holding the de jure rights rests on political, 
wealth and violence advantages for the “first possessor” (home court advantage).  
In Section II we first present a matrix showing the possible combinations of property 
rights which highlights the roles played by economic rents, norms and politics.  Following this 
we  present  a  demand  driven  framework  for  the  initial  settlement  of  the  frontier  which  by 
definition entails settlement with de facto rights either self-enforced or second-party enforced.  
The  framework  highlights  the  likelihood  for  conflict  over  property  rights  as  rents  increase. 
Conflict dissipates some of the rents of settlement and frequently leads to a demand for de jure 
property rights. After a discussion of our demand framework we develop some hypotheses about 
the political supply of the specification and enforcement of rights. In subsequent sections we use 




frontier in the 19
th century along with the potential and realization of land conflict over property 
rights. We are interested in examining the emergence, sustainability, and collapse of de facto 
arrangements as well as the ultimate specification and enforcement of de jure property rights.   
II.  Property Rights and Land Settlement 
Property rights affect the timing of settlement as well as the use of land. A full set of 
property rights includes the following: 1) the right to use the asset in any manner that the user 
wishes, generally with the caveat that such use does not interfere with someone else‟s property 
right; 2) the right to exclude others from the use of the asset; 3) the right to derive income from 
the asset; 4) the right to sell the asset; and 5) the right to bequeath the asset to someone of your 
choice. If one possesses the full set of property rights, resources will be utilized optimally. But, a 
full set of property rights never exists because there are some margins of use that are too costly 
to specify and enforce as Ronald Coase (1960) noted years ago: “sometimes it costs too much to 
put the matter right.”  As a result some attributes may be either de jure or de facto left as open 
access.
1 Individuals and groups have incentives to expropriate use rights over attributes that the 
state leaves as open access. For land settle ment this could lead to different types of behavior 
which can dissipate the rental value of the land.  If land is open to squatting on the basis of first 
possession then people will dissipate some resources in the race to claim land (Anderson and Hill 
1990). If land is left in open access, this may lead to overuse of the land in the familiar problem 
of  the  “tragedy  of  the  commons,”unless  rules  about  use  become  specified  and  enforced. 
Furthermore,  unless  occupants  of  land  have  a  formal  title  to  their  land,  along  with  the 
enforcement by the state, occupants will expend resources defending their claim. In the absence 
of formal specification and enforcement of titles to land, individuals will have an incentive to 
reach  collective  agreements  to  prevent  trespass  from  outsiders  as  well  as  expend  individual 
resources to demarcate and defend claims.   
We illustrate the six possible arrangements of property rights in Table 1 where the columns 
vary according to who specifies the property rights and the rows vary by who enforces the rights. 
On both dimensions the possible actors are first person (the claimant), second party (a group of 
claimants collectively) or third party (government or e.g. gunmen). First party specification and 
enforcement, the top left cell in Table 1, occurs when scarcity is low.  An individual moves to 
the frontier and claims land. The person typically demarcates his claim in some fashion and 
because scarcity is low there is little threat of his keeping the land.   As other claimants move to 
the frontier the potential for rent dissipation increases and enforcement may be transferred either 
to a second or third party.  Enforcement by a second party occurs when norms develop such that 
new entrants respect existing claims.  These norms are generally based on a shared cultural 
endowment within a small group.  In this case, there is first party specification but second party 
enforcement (first column, second row of Table 1).  This arrangement may be sufficient to limit 
rent dissipation and violence during the early stages of migration to the frontier because land 
scarcity is relatively low.   
Where  norms  do  not  evolve  or  are  not  sufficient  to  deter  encroachment,  second  party 
enforcement  may  be  replaced  with  third  party  enforcement  of  de  facto  rights  (first  column, 
bottom row of Table 1).  At this point, incumbents will hire agents or use local government to 
enforce their claims.
2 Settlers may employ third parties, who take on the role of a private militia 
or police force creating a violence advantage over new comers.  Employing agents to enforce 
                                                           
1 Barzel (1989) makes this point most explicitly and clearly.  
2 We will discuss in more detail later the advantages of the first possessors, one of which is the capture of local  




member claims is beneficial when individuals claim large areas reducing their ability to police 
and defend these claims.  Agents may utilize violence to defend their employers‟ claims against 
entrants.  Alternatively, individuals may rely on local government to enforce claims even though 
specification of de jure rights do not exist or are not in the hands of the government enforcer.  
All three cells in the first column indicate that the claimant(s) established de facto property 
rights.  However, formal commons arrangements that is, the creation of clubs or associations is 
absent.  For clubs or associations to form either norms must be very strong or the returns to an 
individual from  the collective must be sufficiently high to  rise above the familiar free rider 
problem.  
 
Table 1 – Specification and Enforcement of Property Rights 
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As competition for land increases with the number of new arrivals at the frontier there may 
be a shift away from first to second party specification.  Second party specification leads to the 
creation  of  commons  arrangements  such  as,  clubs  or  associations.    Formation  of  clubs  or 
associations is more likely when groups are small, homogenous, geographically proximate, and 
shared norms exist.  Once formed enforcement of the club‟s claims may be undertaken by either 
the first, second, or third party; these arrangements correspond to the cells in the middle column 
of Table 1. Exactly who bears the costs of enforcement once de facto property rights have been 
established is determined by the interplay of economics, norms and politics. In some instances, 
column 2, row 1, clubs define rights but there is still self-enforcement. This is a situation where 
claimants all gain legitimacy from the club and do not intrude on each other but the defense 
against outsiders remains in the hands of the individual claimant. A more general outcome is de 
facto  (commons)  specification  and  enforcement-  column  2,  row  2.  For  this  reason,  one 
advantage of creating a formal commons is to spread defense costs across a group of individuals 
all  of  whom  incur  a  smaller  marginal  cost  than  if  they  undertook  defense  individually.    In 
addition to defense from outsiders, e.g. aboriginals or exclusion of new entrants, there may be 
other collective benefits from specification and enforcement in the same hands. If the land is 
used in common, then rules about use will limit the dissipation of rents from overstocking.  The 
benefits from organization are greater for specification and enforcement if there are additional 
collective goods provided by the commons for which there exist economies of scale.  
In the absence of exogenous shocks, second party specification and enforcement may remain 
stable over a long period.  However, there may be a point at which second party enforcement is 
no longer sufficient to prevent encroachment.  For example, legislative changes may induce 
competition for land, increasing the costs of collective defense.  At this point, the club may find 
it cost effective to hire third party enforcement or, local governments may enforce the rights of 
the commons even though they did not define the rights. Much like the case where there is
 first 
party specification and third party enforcement, employing agents to enforce member claims is 




Alternatively, the club may rely on government to enforce member claims even though de jure 
rights are absent.  In this case, local officials enforce de facto land claims either because club 
members are local officials or because government officials can obtain economic and/or political 
rents from the club.  In some instances the association may offer monetary compensation for 
government  enforcement  by  paying  bribes.  Assuming  some  degree  of  democracy  exists, 
political  rents  are  the  currency  the  club  can  offer  local  officials  in  return  for  enforcement, 
specifically votes or campaign contributions.   
Column 3 contains the cells for the specification of de jure rights, which by definition means 
specification by the authorized government.  Government specification often takes place after the 
creation of de facto rights and it is at this point that de jure rights can either recognize the de 
facto claimants or undermine the existing de facto rights.  Governments may choose to define but 
not enforce de jure rights – column 3, rows 1 and 2. As with earlier rights structures, economics, 
norms and politics may play varying roles over time and space. For example, with an extended 
suffrage,  politicians  may  assign  property  rights  to  redistribute  land  away  from  the  de  facto 
claimants, who may have the highest economic return.  Further, if de jure rights do not support 
the prevailing de facto allocation the government will increase the potential for conflict if they 
choose not to enforce the de jure rights – rows 1 and 2. Government specification and first party 
enforcement means that individuals must defend their de jure rights against others.  In this case, 
the costs of defense may outweigh the benefits of the de jure rights, therefore individuals will opt 
against migration to the frontier.  This will lower the likelihood of conflict between newcomers 
and  incumbents  by  limiting  competition.    Government  specification  and  second  party 
enforcement (middle cell, bottom row of Table 1) exists when the government allocates de jure 
rights but enforcement takes place via a commons arrangement.  Enforcement by a commons 
arrangement may emerge where governments either lack sufficient resources to enforce claims or 
choose not enforce de jure rights for political reasons. If clubs did not previously exist prior to 
government specification, they may be formed at this point with their sole purpose being to 
defend  the  rights  of  extant  claimants  against  encroachment.    The  final  and  most  complete 
category of de jure rights is where there is government specification and enforcement of property 
rights. Here the government allocates and enforces rights, reducing the potential for conflict 
because we assume that governments have a comparative advantage in violence.
3   
As discussed earlier economic rents, political rents and norms all play roles in the 
specification and enforcement of property rights. To better understand the roles played by each 
we will first present a “demand” driven framework for the emergence of property rights. The 
core of the framework is that economic rents drive the determination of property rights.  We 
illustrate in Figure 1 the “demand” for more secure property rights as a function of its scarcity 
value. In Figure 1 the horizontal axis measures the relative scarcity of a given resource (from 
right to left) and the vertical axis measures the net present value that accrues to the claimant of 
that  resource.  The  line  segment  ABCDE  shows  that  the  net  present  value  of  the  resource 
decreases as it becomes less scarce. We assume that the line segment ABCDE represents the 
highest return from using the resource with varying amounts of capital or labor.  
 
 
                                                           
3 This assumption flows from numerous accounts of the role of the state in preventing the dissipation of rents. For 




















The  returns  from  land  use  given  relative  prices  may  be  greater  for  relatively  capital 
intensive activities e.g., cattle ranching or more labor intensive activities, e.g., pre-mechanized 
agriculture.  In the case of land the measure of scarcity value could be the distance of a plot of 
land to a market center, as transportation costs are often the main determinant of land value. At 
point E land is so far from the market center or so abundant that the economic return is zero. The 
segment GLCDE represents the net present value of land under an open access arrangement. OH 
represents the opportunity cost of the settlers with the lowest opportunity cost, given the costs of 
settling on the frontier. 
Settling on the frontier will vary considerably with climatic conditions. For example, the 
fixed costs of migrating and sustaining a subsistence standard of living are lower in tropical 
regions than in colder climates, where settlers may have to wait a year to plant and harvest crops. 
In Figure 1, point K represents the economic frontier where it becomes worthwhile for a settler to 
migrate to the frontier.
4  At points between J and K open access conditions prevail which means 
that property rights are not formally defined or enforced, but this does not affect the return to the 
resource given that it is still abundant relative to the competition for it. Though land is abundant, 
migrants may find it worthwhile to establish norms pertaining to the amount of land claimed.
5  
This appears relatively easy to do because  initially the settlers are relatively homogeneous with 
respect to their opportunity costs and typically other socio -economic endowments.  In terms of 
our taxonomy this would be second party specification and first person enforcement. 
                                                           
4 In our figure, distance is the frontier but it could as easily be the quality of soil. Our framework of “rents” 
determining arrival times on the frontier under open access conditions is an endowments explanation but for both 
commons arrangements to emerge as well as formal rights, norms or politics will matter.  




As the net present value increases, e.g. because of lower transportation costs or higher prices 
for the output of the land – represented here as the upward sloping line segment CD as one 
moves leftward from K - new users arrive, yet they are able to get access to the resource without 
detracting much from the use of those who were already there. At distance IJ resource users still 
tend to be relatively homogenous, but the return from an open access resource - ILCJ - is lower 
than moving to a more limited commons – IBCJ- one in which new entry is restricted. The 
relatively higher return from a commons arrangement excluding outsiders creates the demand for 
informal property rights, which are sufficient to mitigate the otherwise existing dissipation of the 
rental stream. It is easier for homogeneous users to reach agreements concerning exclusivity for 
two reasons: 1) the claimants generally share similar cultural norms (endowments); and 2) in 
some  instances  there  is  a  common  collective  good  that  will  bring  people  together  to  reach 
agreements. With a common cultural background, potential disputes are easily defused as social 
pressure along with the incentive to cooperate yields higher expected returns than confrontation. 
The most obvious collective good is common defense to prevent encroachments from potential 
claimants. Squatting prevails  yet the absence of government-enforced private property rights 
does not pose significant costs.
6  The wedge BLC is the marginal return from switching from 
open access with limited norm specification to collective or commons arrangements for land in 
region IJ. In our taxonomy this is a movement from second party (norm) specification with self-
enforcement to second party specification and enforcement. There is a gain to having a commons 
arrangement consisting of de facto property rights, as opposed to open access, but not yet for 
having formally defined property rights. That is, the level of competition for land is sufficiently 
high that open access would lead to losses, but not sufficiently high for formal property rights to 
be an improvement over commons arrangements. 
For land in the region OI, closer to the market center, NPVs are higher, and the informal 
institutions that developed can no longer cope with the increased competition for the resource. It 
becomes  necessary  to  expend  effort,  time  and  money  to  assure  continued  possession  of  the 
resource and the income derived from it. This may involve incurring costs to exclude others or 
the cost from sub-optimal uses. It may also include the costs to lobbying for changes from de 
facto to de jure property rights. At some point it becomes beneficial in the aggregate to have 
officially defined and enforced de jure property rights. The increased value that would result 
from formally defined and enforced de jure property rights is the pie-shaped area ABF which 
represents the increased value of land versus the next best commons arrangement for property 
rights. ABF is the potential rent that forms the basis for the demand for de jure property rights. In 
our taxonomy this would be a movement from second party specification and enforcement to 
third  party  specification  and  enforcement.  Nevertheless,  the  movement  from  a  commons 
arrangement to de jure property rights entails redistribution which in turn generates the potential 
for conflict, an issue we return to later. 
Many of the early studies on the evolution of property rights simply assumed that as the area 
ABF  became  sufficiently  large  de  jure  property  rights  would  emerge.  This  notion  has  been 
termed the naïve theory of property rights, as it does not analyze the collective action problems 
or the politics that determine the supply of formal property rights (Eggertsson, 1990:250). In 
order to bring into the analysis the supply of property rights we extend our model so as to 
                                                           
6 See Anderson and Hill (2002); Eggertsson (1990); Ostrom (1990); and (2009); and Umbeck (1981) for accounts of 
local groups allocating resources under “common” arrangements. See Smith (2000) for an analysis of “semi-




explicitly incorporate the fact that competing types of settlers with a different set of endowments 
typically arrive at different times at the frontier.
7 In our case study these different groups are, in 
order of arrival, large coffee plantation owners with slaves  versus smallholders in Brazil. By 
focusing on the different endowments of the competing groups we can analyze the disputes that 
arise over land and make inferences about how these differing  endowments affect the political 
outcome that ultimately decides the form of the property rights that will emerge. 
As stated in our initial discussion of  Figure 1 the NPV from land may vary by whether the 
land is put into cattle or agriculture. Relatively abundant capital versus labor endowed claimants 
may face separate NPV schedules due to different access to inputs required to make the land 
productive, such as capital, technology  or experience. Once we incorporate different payoffs 
from using the land, it becomes possible for the first entrant to have higher opportunity costs 
than  the  subsequent  arrivals,  for  example  in  Brazil   where  large  coffee  plantation  owners  
preceded smallholders. These situations are depicted in Figure  2 where two sets of NPVs are 
superimposed. The set with higher NPVs for land in a given region is marked with capital letters 
and, to simplify the exposition, will be referred to as „capital‟ whereas the lower set, with non-
capitalized letters, will be referred to as „labor‟. 
As drawn in Figure 2 capital arrives at the frontier at K prior to labor which arrives at k, 
despite the fact that capital‟s opportunity cost is higher than labor‟s, OH>oh. Naturally different 
relative opportunity costs and NPVs could lead to labor arriving first.
8 Whatever the case, the 
asynchronous nature of arrival allows one group to establish and entrench itself on the land, 
possibly for a long period of time. When the second type of claimant arrives the NPV curves of 
the incumbent adjust themselves to reflect the increased competition. This adjustment would 
typically involve three movements; (i) an overall decrease of the NPV at each point; (ii) an 
increase of the area   of the wedges that represent the gains to having  de  facto  commons 
arrangements versus open access as well as the gains from de jure property rights over commons 
arrangements; and (iii) a rightward shift of points J and I with de facto commons arrangements 
and de jure property rights becoming desirable earlier given the presence of a new entrant. The 
curves of the entrant already reflect in “Cournot” fashion the NPVs that take into account the 
incumbent‟s presence. 
If we consider Figure 2 to represent the situation after the adjustment of the incumbent‟s 
payoffs to the threat of entrant‟s arrival, we see that to the left of point k both types will find it in 
their interest to be on the land. The more to the left, that is, the higher the return to the use of the 
land, the greater will be the competition among the groups. The greater this competition the 
greater will be the incentive for commons arrangements to emerge and the greater will be the 
demand for de facto and later de jure property rights. 
 
 
                                                           
7 Libecap (2007) stresses this point. 
8 As drawn the figure implies that one type of claimant would always be able to make more productive use of the 
land at each distance for a given type of property rights, implying that in order to achieve efficiency the most 
valued user should retain the use rights and ultimately the government should allocate property rights to the 
highest valued user. However, it can very well be the case that one use of the land, such as ranching, is more 
productive in a frontier situation (towards the right of the graph) and another type of use, e.g. agriculture, is more 
productive once the frontier has evolved (towards the left). In this case inefficient land use would arise if i) secure 
property rights – though these may be informal -were not in place to facilitate the transfer of the land to its higher 




Figure 2 – The demand for property rights with competing claimants. 
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Initially de jure property rights will be non-existent, but as value increases, the potential 
“rents‟ will be an incentive for the government with authority to act which may:  sustain the 
incumbent‟s  de  facto  rights;  redistribute  the  specification  and  enforcement  of  de  jure  rights 
towards  the  entrant;  or  any  myriad  intermediate  combinations,  the  most  common  of  which 
appears to be specification without enforcement. Clearly the outcome depends on the result of 
politics, which involves not only the incumbent and the entrant, but also local and the central 
governments, including their voters and constituencies. 
The question that arises is whether anything can be said about the determinants of the supply 
response by governments.  Though we cannot predict specific outcomes, we can discuss the 
characteristics of the claimants along with the political institutions in place both of which affect 
the supply of property rights.
9 Once the new entrant has arrived on the frontier there is the 
potential for dispute and conflict. This dispute plays out both physically,  in loco, as well as 
politically. It is almost tautological that ceteris paribus the greater the relative capabilities for 
violence of one  group  over the other, the greater the probability that the emergent  de facto 
property rights will favor that group. But this prediction can become more precise if we note that 
the sequential nature of the groups‟ arrivals implies that the early entrant will have a “home 
court” advantage as it is often easier to defend than to usurp.
10 This advantage is particularly 
                                                           
9 The degree of suffrage appears to be an important determinant in our case studies. 
10 Smith (2002: S482) argues: “In common-pool arrangements regimes, exclusion seems to be basic in the sense 
that efforts at exclusion are the first methods used to define property in a resource. The evidence from English 
land use is consistent with early exclusion.” Smith (2002) gives numerous other examples consistent with current 
“rights” holders using exclusion successfully to deter entrants. Acheson’s (1979 and 1988) discussion of the use of 
exclusion amongst lobster fishermen is a particularly good example consistent with “home court” advantage.  




significant in the situation portrayed in Figure 2 where the incumbent was drawn to the frontier 
by high benefits rather than by low opportunity costs. In addition there may be further rents that 
the incumbents capture through information gathered over time by being on the land. These 
benefits  translate into  economic and potentially political  clout that enhances  the home court 
advantage. Thus the greater the head start of the incumbent, that is, the time between K and k, 
and the greater the incumbent‟s NPV in that period, the greater the likelihood that the incumbent 
will retain de facto property rights. The “home court” advantage should also help in the political 
allocation of rights which the incumbent would demand at distance J and the entrant at distance j. 
Importantly, which will become clear in our case studies the specification of de jure rights may 
be part of the NPV of the entrant. The home court advantage translates into more resources to 
lobby for de jure property rights by the incumbent compared to the entrant as well as lobbying 
for a lack of enforcement of de jure rights in the case that this caused new entrants. But, lobbying 
is not the sole factor determining the government‟s specification and enforcement of property 
rights.    
  Another important characteristic of the competing claimants for determining the supply of 
property rights is the relative size of the gains from having de jure property rights, versus losing 
completely to  the other claimant.  In other words,  the claimants  would be willing to  expend 
everything above their opportunity cost to secure the right though in principle one would only 
need to expend an amount greater than the alternative claimant. For the “capitalist” he would be 
willing to expend area HABCD and for labor, she would be willing to expend habcd.
11 These 
areas measure the rents over opportunity cost from getting effective de jure property rights for 
each group assuming all entrants within a group have the same opportunity cost. To the extent 
that opportunity costs increase for later entrants then the willingness to pay would be less. In the 
political world the amount that they would need to pay most likely would be substantially less 
because of only needing a winning coalition. It is not the case that we can simply compare both 
values and infer that the one with the larger gains will prevail as the outcome depends as well on 
other  circumstances  such  as  the  preferences  of  the  actors  involved  in  the  political  process. 
Nevertheless, we can infer that for any given political process, the differences in the relative 
gains  to  each  group  will  increase  their  willingness  to  invest  in  lobbying  and  increase  the 
probability of a favorable outcome to that group
12 – though the outcome for the capitalist may 
simply be a lack of government enforcement of the extant de jure specified rights of the new 
entrant.  
The distribution of the gains from secure formal property rights among the members of the 
same group may also be a characteristic with important consequences for the property rights that 
get supplied. Note that in Figure 2 these gains are triangle-shaped (ABF and abf), implying that 
some members of the group receive greater gains from secure private rights than others. One 
could imagine a situation in which that area would be closer to a rectangle with most members 
receiving  similar  gains.  Under  such  circumstances  the  collective  action  which  is  crucial  for 
mounting the demand for property rights may be easier to achieve than in the case where the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
mechanisms for controlling behavior on the commons that “a limit on behavior is pointless unless access is limited 
first.” 
11 For the “capitalist” some rents  may be used to prevent the enforcement of the de jure rights of labor endowed 
claimants whereas for the labor endowed claimants some rents may be expended to have their de jure rights 
enforced. 




intragroup heterogeneity is larger.
13 Groups with better collective action will,  ceteris paribus, 
have higher probabilities of being favored by the political process. 
  Lobbying  by  special  interest  groups  matter  but  politicians  also  have  to  pay  heed  to  the 
preferences of voters, particularly if the issue is salient and suffrage is universal. Given the 
centrality of land to production, especially in agricultural and pastoral economies, the property 
rights to land are an important issue in the utility function of individuals. If the franchise is 
widely held, e.g. all adult males regardless of land ownership, then we would expect to see the 
property rights to land favor the small holder.  
  Finally,  we  can  make  inferences  regarding  the  outcomes  of  the  political  process  by 
considering even some very general characteristics of that process. The preferences of the central 
government are naturally key determinants of the outcome. Whether those preferences support 
the incumbent or the entrant is an important factor, but by no means the sole determinant of the 
outcome. Where political support favors the first arrival this adds to the “home court” advantage 
and greatly increases the probability that the early arrivals will stay on the land, to a point where 
de jure property rights might not even strictly be necessary as de facto rights are bolstered by 
both political and physical strength. It is even possible, as we shall see in the Brazilian case, that 
this  situation  evolves with the incumbents (large coffee planters) effectively taking over the 
government.  Where  the  political  support  at  the  center  supports  the  newer  entrant  the  final 
outcome still depends on other factors, such as the size of the “home court” advantage. If the 
support provided by the central authority is enough to overcome the resistance of the incumbent 
we will see the specification of de jure property rights transferring rights from the incumbent to 
the entrant. But, in many instances the political will is sufficient to change the de jure rights but 
not enough to implement the enforcement of de jure property rights. As such de facto rights may 
determine resource use for a long time, a situation we shall see that prevailed in our U.S.  case 
study for over 50 years. The disjuncture between the specification and enforcement of rights in 
many instances  appears to  be the result of the specification being in  the hands  of a central 
government while the enforcement is in hands of a local government which is captured by the 
earlier wealthier arrivals.  
  In the next sections we analyze the process of the emergence and evolution of property rights 
for land on the frontiers in Brazil in the 19
th century, using the taxonomy and framework above 
as guides for the analysis. Over time potential or actual disputes arise between entrant groups and 
there is a demand by claimants for de jure property rights to reduce the rent dissipation that 
emerges from those disputes. This demand is eventually met with a supply of de jure property 
rights which in all three cases involves the central government as the key player and indirectly 
the interests they represent, which in some cases are the direct contenders and in other cases 
more diffuse constituencies such as voters. We show how the characteristics of the players, the 
markets that determine the NPVs, and the nature of the political process determine the property 
rights that emerge. 
 
III.  Settlement of the Brazilian frontier 
In 1822, a few weeks before achieving independence from Portugal, the Emperor of 
Brazil suspended the use of sesmarias (large land grants), the main formal means through which 
                                                           
13 Ostrom (2009) has argued that in some situations heterogeneity may be beneficial in overcoming the collective 
action problem of organization. This is also well-know in cartel literature in IO; if there is a member who 
disproportionately would win from collective action, this player would incur the costs of organizing and sustaining 




land had been granted since the 16
th century, leaving no land law in its place. Over the previous 
centuries the colony‟s economy had been through a sugar cycle (1550-1650) and a gold cycle 
(1700-1780) both predominantly based on slave labor.  Although the formal route for access to 
land had been the sesmarias, which were free and readily available to those who owned slaves, 
land was not scarce and so could easily be squatted on. The suspension of the sesmarias was 
partly a reflection of the abundance of land, particularly in a period (early 19
th century) when 
economic activity was at an all time low (Furtado, 1959). From 1822 to 1850 there were no 
formal rules regarding the access and use of land and the issue was not even mentioned in the 
new country‟s constitution of 1824. After the 1830s, however, the economic viability of coffee 
started to improve and plantations quickly started to spread, first in the region of Rio de Janeiro 
and then gradually expanding the frontier south towards São Paulo and eventually westward in 
the São Paulo interior. 
This process of frontier expansion conforms to the dynamics of our model in Section II 
yet with some idiosyncrasies given the details of the Brazilian economy in the period when the 
scarcity of land started to kick in. The early entrants were large slave owners (referred to as 
capital in Section II).
14 Initially landowners imported slaves to use during the sugar and gold 
booms but  these had been under-utilized since the end of the gold cycle in 1780  given the 
stagnant economy. The slave/landowners were thus willing to engage in the production of coffee 
even before coffee prices, as well as those of other commodities, started to rise after the 1840s. 
In a sense the landowners were already on the frontier, tho ugh they may not have moved to the 
frontier given the new relative prices after the sugar and gold booms ended. There were very few 
small landowners because the Brazilian economy up to that point had offered little return for 
smallholders who could not afford slaves. Few immigrants were willing to go to Brazil while 
slavery and large plantations were the norm.
15 In this period there was consequently first person 
specification and self-enforcement, which due to low scarcity was easily achieved. 
As the NPV to land started to rise with the prospect of higher coffee prices and the 
diffusion of the habit of drinking coffee throughout the world, the demand for land increased 
leading to a rapidly expanding frontier. With higher NPVs competition for the land increased and 
two separate problems emerged for the coffee producers. The first problem is that in the absence 
of any de jure rule for allocating land the de facto reality had been massive levels of squatting by 
large landowners covering huge expanses of land that were not actually occupied or used, given 
the low level of economic activities that had prevailed following the end of the gold cycle. 
Claims overlapped but this did not lead to conflict while land was beyond the economic frontier 
–the point that would induce migration.
16  With the rise in NPVs, however, and the prospect of 
imminent higher returns even from land still beyond the frontier, conflicts erupted, both physical 
and legal as competing claimants tried to make their claims prevail.  Dean (1971: 611) states that 
during  this  period  “...the  landowners  hired  gunmen  killed  not  only  recalcitrant  backwoods 
„intruders‟,  but  also  other  landowners.”    Similarly  Osório  Silva  (1996:  133)  notes  that  “… 
                                                           
14 Though coffee requires a lot of labor, initially coffee cultivation was performed by slaves, a capital asset from the 
owners’ viewpoint. In addition coffee is between a tree and perennial shrub, lending it more to designation of 
capital intensive. The relative applications of labor or capital do not affect our analysis of settlement.    
15 It remains as puzzle as to why more immigrants did not migrate to the South of Brazil where the return to self-
sufficient farming appeared to be higher than the return that prospective immigrants reaped in Portugal or in 
many other countries. If it was a capital constraint, what prevented an indenture market from arising?  
16  A similar situation occurred in the Amazon in the 20
th century following the collapse of the rubber boom in the 
early part of the 20




litigation and disputes over boundaries were in the order of the day, being responsible for a great 
part of the fights among families and crimes in the interior.”  The need to hire gunmen and 
lawyers marks a shift to third party enforcement, while specification was still first party. The 
costs and rent dissipation generated by such conflicts was one of the sources of a rising demand 
for formal property rights to land by mid-19
th century. 
A separate issue which also fueled the demand for a new land law at this time was the 
pressure by the English for the end of slavery. Brazil had managed to evade earlier attempts by 
the British to impose this prohibition, but by mid-century it was becoming obvious that the 
importation  of  slaves  would  have  to  cease  in  the  near  future  and  complete  abolition  would 
eventually  follow.  As  coffee  production  was  completely  based  on  slave  labor  and  large 
plantations, this situation required that a new source of labor, European immigration, be set up to 
allow a smooth transition. Doing so, however, involved establishing a land law that would assure 
that the immigrant labor would effectively be directed towards the plantations rather that moving 
to the frontier to squat on land of their own. Landowners needed to eliminate the availability of 
free land if they were to retain their privileged position.
17 In other words there was a need to 
move to third party specification. 
In 1850 a new land law ( Lei de Terras N
o 601) was finally approved and in that same 
year  the  transatlantic  slave  trade  officially  and  effectively  ceased.  The  law  had  two  main 
provisions: 1) validation with no restrictions on all land claims obtained prior to 1850, whether 
from  sesmarias  or  plain  squatting;  and  2)  purchase  was  the  only  legal  means  of  securing 
additional land.  Given that Parliament essentially represented the landed elite the validation of 
squatting was not contentious.
18 The second measure was less consensual as the landowners in 
frontier  São  Paulo  regions  (represented  by  the  Liberal  party)  faced  plenty  of  land  to  be 
appropriated  in  the  futur e,  while  the  landowners  in  the  closed  Rio  de  Janeiro  frontier 
(represented by the Conservative party and closer to Emperor) did not have such opportunities. 
The first pass at approving the law in the early 1840s was blocked by the Liberals coming to 
power, but upon the Conservative return in 1850 the law  was approved imposing the restriction 
on further squatting. As we shall see the consolidation of the frontier landowners‟ power in the 
second  half  of  the  19
th  century  implied  that  this  restriction  was  not  enforced  and  land  was 
continuously squatted for decades to come. The inability of the central government to apply the 
law meant that specification remained in first party hands. The de jure stipulation of purchase 
would come to play an instrumental role in impeding the access to land by immigrant laborers 
after abolition of slavery in 1888. At that point enforcement and specification would be done by 
the state governments, but were used primarily in favor of the landowning oligarchies and to stop 
immigrant labor from having access to land. 
The framework in Figure 1 helps to understand the situation described above. The ideal 
situation for the landowners would have been a continuation of slavery and a land law that did 
not restrict their expansion into the frontier but simply arbitrated the conflicts among themselves 
inherent in that expansion. Such a scenario would yield returns along the upper envelope of the 
                                                           
17 This is a recommendation that had already been made in the Australian context by 19
th century British 
economist E.G. Wakefield, who was often cited in the parliamentary debates throughout the 1840s in Brazil when 
this issue has hotly debated (Dean, 1971: 613; Osório Silva, 1996: 99; Carvalho, 1988: 86). 
18 Even by the end of the Empire in 1888 only 1.5% of the population had the right to vote. The franchise was 
limited to men over 25 with “means.” The electorate voted for an electoral college of sorts which then chose the 
deputies. The emperor chose the senators. Over time power tilted in favor of the landowners in Sao Paulo region 




NPV curves, ABCD. For the landowners this would be the equivalent of the secure property 
rights situation. The property rights could even be merely de facto as they would be secure 
because there are no immigrant laborers to compete for land. But with the end of slavery that 
scenario was no longer available. The alternatives depended on finding a way to successfully 
substitute immigrants for slaves. If a change in property rights did not emerge that promoted 
immigration yet kept the immigrants from seeking their own land, then the NPV faced by the 
landowners would be the lower returns GLCD. From the perspective of the landowners this can 
be thought of as the open access situation with free entrance and dissipated rents. If, however, 
the land law of 1850 achieved its purpose of forcing immigrants to sell their labor for several 
years before being able to purchase their own land, the return to the plantation owners would be 
above the open access situation and below the secure (de facto) property rights situation. This 
would be a return along FBCD in Figure 2. We can think of the new land law as a commons 
arrangement in the sense that the importation of immigrants and their containment as laborers 
rather than owners was a collective good with severe free-rider problems. In effect this is the 
outcome that prevailed once slavery was abolished. Although the higher NPVs associated with 
slavery were no longer attainable, a second-best (from the point of view of the landowners) was 
achieved through massive immigration, with the free-rider problem solved by having the central 
and state governments finance and coordinate the immigration process.
19  
Immigration did not increase all that dramatically immediately after the passage of the 
1850  Land  Law.  Although  the  importation  of  slaves  had  been  forbidden  it  was  clear  to 
landowners that the use of the stock of slaves could be maintained for several decades yet. Given 
the high returns to coffee production under slavery, the law was not enforced and the frontier 
continued  expanding  through  further  squatting  on  the  frontier.  The  law  required  that  all 
landowners demarcate and register their properties so that the State, in principle, could sell the 
remaining land. In practice landowners did not register their land and either claimed that any 
subsequent encroachments had been squatted on prior to 1850, and were thus legitimized by the 
Land Law, or were able to lobby successfully for ever later years as the benchmark for legitimate 
claims, thus maintaining. 
Carvalho  (1988:  94)  provides  a  detailed  account  of  how  the  landowners  evaded  and 
ignored all the restrictions from the Land Law that were contrary to their interest.  The sale of 
land, which, according to the Law of 1850, was supposed to finance the immigration effort, was 
insignificant  and  when  the  pressure  for  the  abolition  of  slavery  increased  in  the  1880s  the 
government had to turn instead to the general budget.  The capture of government by landowners 
intensified after 1889 when Brazil became a republic and state governments received significant 
power and autonomy.
20 Most states adopted land legislation that essentially replicated the 1850 
                                                           
19 From 1892 to 1930 the revenue from coffee export tax was 50% of the total tax revenue in São Paulo. During this 
period the expenditures on immigration programs were on average 5.2% of the total tax revenue and 10.5% of 
coffee tax revenue (data from Holloway, 1980). Therefore it is not the case that the coffee producers were mostly 
paying for the immigration themselves.  According to Carvalho (1988: 100): “Immigration was financed with 
budgetary resources that subsidized transportation,  immigration and colonization companies, as well as farmers 
and immigrants. The costs were socialized not only among the farmers, but among the taxpaying population 
through the public budget, both at the central and at the provincial levels.” 
20 The coffee planters in the São Paulo frontier were major players in the overthrow of the Brazilian throne, 
together with parts of the army and the urban middle class (Viotti da Costa, 1985). The discontent of planters 
arose from both the abolition of slavery and the restriction which the Land Law tried to impose on their ability to 




Land Law. Although in de jure terms this legislation prohibited further incorporation of land to 
the  private  domain  through  squatting,  in  practice  “…  the  fundamental  characteristic  of  the 
legislation approved by the states was the liberality towards the (large) squatters” (Osório Silva, 
1996: 255.) It was actually convenient for the local oligarchies to have the law in place for 
selective use to keep others from access to land. This period can thus be interpreted as a switch 
to third party specification and enforcement. 
By the time that the maintenance of slavery was no longer politically sustainable in the 
1880s, the importation of immigrant labor had been effectively organized and the abolition of 
slavery in  1888 and transition  to free labor came about  with  few tribulations for the coffee 
planters apart from the unavoidable move to a second-best form of labor. The flow of immigrants 
in the subsequent decades, especially in São Paulo, the main coffee region, guaranteed a steady 
availability of labor at low wages (Bazanezi et al., 2008: 92; Hall, 1969; Halloway, 1980).
 21 The 
period after the proclamation of the republic in 1889 up to 1930 would be the golden age of 
coffee with ever-expanding planted area and prices kept high by government intervention despite 
systematic over-production. It is in this period that the landowners faced the biggest threat of 
entry of immigrant laborers who could potentially squat on marginal land prior to the arrival of 
the coffee capitalists.  
In the Brazilian case the political equilibrium was clearly skewed towards the landowners 
and the laborers stood very little chance of winning any dispute for land, whether physical or 
political. Local oligarchies dominated access to land and power in their regions, usually through 
the figure of the all-powerful coronel that presided with feudal-like rights and reigned through a 
mixture of paternalism and violence, strengthened by his association to central state politicians to 
whom he could deliver votes.
22 Laborers typically lived and worked  on large plantations and 
were even given the right to plant for their own use, but access to land ownership was rarely a 
possibility. Even if one managed to squat on land in marginal frontier areas, it would typically be 
difficult to retain the land once the coffee frontier arrived and competing claims (often with 
questionable titles) by the large landowners emerged (Osório Silva, 1996: 336). Thus in Brazil 
the „coronels‟ effectively preempted the entrants (in Figure 2) and the coffee planters retained 
strong de jure and even stronger de facto rights bolstered by their political dominance.
23 This 
                                                           
21 Rivera, Nugent and Saddi (2004) argued that land laws evolved through the 1850-1920 period in a way that 
made property rights more secure as a means to encourage immigration. They create an index of the precision of 
the law that varies over time and use this in a first-order vector autoregression specification, where the other 
dependent variable is the annual flow of immigration and the explanatory variables are coffee exports, terms of 
trade and presence of slaves (dummy). In the equation where the flow of immigrants is the dependent variable 
they are surprised to find that the lagged total precision of the law has a negative effect on immigration as their 
story predicted a positive relation. Their result is however perfectly compatible with our analysis where coffee 
planters use their clout, including politically through the law, to deny access to land for immigrants and other 
potential smallholders. 
22 The key to the power of the coronels was the control of the franchise which was not secret. Universal literate 
male suffrage existed which gave the franchise over time to 6% by the 1920s.  Despite the stipulation of literacy 
coronels could deliver the votes of their workers. Workers exchanged their votes as part of the paternalistic 
package offered by the coronels. Many aspects of the rural paternalistic system are similar to what prevailed in the 
U.S. on large plantations from the 1890s until the mechanization of cotton in the 1960s (Alston and Ferrie, 1993). 
23 Note that although there are not significant economies of scale for growing coffee, the pattern of production 




process was not devoid of violent conflict, not only against potential small entrants, but between 
the  different  oligarchy/families  that  disputed  not  only  land  but  control  of  municipal  power. 
According to Osório Silva (1996: 263 ):  
 … the  benevolence of  the state‟s land policies towards the squatters  did  not 
imply a democratization of the access to land.  … The essential condition for a 
squatter to become an owner was to stay on the land that is to be legalized for a 
sufficiently long time. To stay on the land does not necessarily mean to cultivate 
it, but rather to stop others from squatting on it and/or avoid being removed from 
the land by the municipal and state authorities in charge of the public patrimony, 
who  acted  with  scandalous  impartiality.  To  stay  on  the  land  the  large 
farmer/squatter counted on his own resources (armed henchmen) and sought to 
stay well connected with the state authorities. … Thus in the long run the little 
vigilance that the small squatters could muster to try to stay on the land was 
useless. Their permanence on the land was temporary and unstable; lasting only 
until stronger forces showed up to kick them out.    Osório Silva, 1996: 336-337. 
After 1930 Brazil initiated in earnest its industrialization process and a shift of power 
from  rural  to  urban  elites  started  to  take  place.  By  then  the  extremely  concentrated  land 
ownership  structure  was  consolidated.  The  process  of  frontier  expansion  from  that  time  has 
followed a similar pattern, where land is titled long before it is occupied. The peasants that 
initially  occupy  the  land  are  the  first  stage  through  which  the  frontier  expands.  They  are 
subsequently  replaced  by  large  landowners  in  a  process  that  Foweraker  (1981:  10)  notes  is 
mediated by law, the bureaucracy and possibly violence. 
The  slowness  and  bias  of  the  legal  system,  and  the  very  concept  of 
„ownership ‟of land work against the peasant on the frontier. Legal right to land 
always belongs with others, and their own „legal‟ claims and protests are always 
invalidated by the mysterious language of the law and bureaucracy. … (W)here 
the provisions of the law are incomplete or insufficient, then violence is used to 
force the peasants from the land, or sever their surplus from them. (Foweraker, 
1981: 117) 
 
  Only in  the 1990s, with the rise of the Landless  Peasants  Movement  (MST),  did 
landless peasants begin to master this „mysterious language‟ and start to use the law and 
bureaucracy  to  achieve  access  to  land  through  land  reform  (see  Alston,  Libecap  and 
Mueller, 1999a,b, 2000, 2008). 
 
VI.  Concluding Remarks 
In our analytical framework there is a progression of settlement: from squatters, with 
self-enforcement; to de facto commons arrangements; and ultimately to de jure titled land. In the 
Brazilian  case  the  absence  of  any  specified  de  jure  property  rights  by  the  government 
enforcement led to de facto self-enforced and third party enforced claims, along with sporadic 
conflicts. The Brazilian case had a high potential for conflict with immigrants but with little 
conflict actually occurring. Large coffee plantation owners harnessed their political power to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
property rights rather than endowments being the primary determinant as in Engerman and Sokoloff (1997). We 




prevent  competition  over  land  claims  persuading  the  central  and  state  governments  to  deny 
immigrants access to land.  The violence advantage of local coronels reinforced their political 
power. In turn, this reduced the potential and actual conflict that may have occurred between the 
coronels and the immigrants. Nevertheless, conflict did erupt periodically among the large coffee 
planters. Because of the huge gains to claimants from securing land through violence and the 
absence for many years of any access to de jure rights, the large planters only acted collectively 
in the political arena to exclude outsiders (immigrants), and to legitimate their squatted claims.  
 More generally the political power of the first claimants tend to influence the supply of 
formal property rights to their claims. In countries such as Australian and US, which also had 
extensive frontier processes, where this political power was relatively diluted by the size of the 
franchise, the supply of de jure rights was not in their favor. However, a lack of enforcement of 
de jure rights for entrants resulted in incumbents being able to prevent the initial reallocation 
attempts by utilizing either a wealth and/or violence advantage.  In Brazil the wealth and political 
advantage of the initial claimants was overwhelmingly stronger than the potential entrants. Our 
analysis suggests that de facto rights tend to prevail for a time even in the presence of de jure 
rights that fail to support them because of the lack of political will to enforce de jure rights.  
Generally, the supply of formal rights to land will be associated with rent dissipation if formal 
rights do not recognize the status quo de facto rights. Rent dissipation took the forms of land use 
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  In this appendix we show how the magnitude of the NPV associated with having secure 
private property affects the willingness of claimants to organize, lobby and fight for those rights. 
Let 
PP be the NPV a claimant receives if the land becomes private property. The claimant has 
some expectation of the probability that his side will win the dispute and get private property. 
This probability, , is a function of the effort, e, his side puts towards lobbying, fighting, rent-
seeking, persuading, etc. Thus (e) is the probability the claimants will be granted de jure and de 
facto private property. 
Assuming that when one group is granted private property the other gets nothing, the 
expected NPV for a claimant is (let the superscript i=k, l represent capital or labor. 
                                                              (1) 
And the return to effort is:  
        
     
      
                                                 (2) 
The optimal amount of effort is given by: 
                                                            (3) 
where C
i(·) is the cost of effort. 
This maximization yields the standard result that in equilibrium the marginal benefit of effort 
equals the marginal cost of effort. 
      
           
       
                                                    (4) 
This expression can be used to determine the effect of a change of the value of land under 
private property on claimant i's optimal effort? 
   
        
 
      
    
            
        
        
      
                   (5) 
  This  is  positive  as  the  denominator  is  the  second  order  condition  of  the  maximization 
problem and is negative. This means that the greater the total value of the land under private 
property, that type of claimant will put in effort towards assuring those rights, which is what we 
set out to show. 
One could argue, however, that to be more accurate the analysis should include the fact 
that when deciding the optimal amount of effort each group of claimants would take into account 
the other side‟s reactions in Cournot fashion. Repeating the exercise above but allowing each 
sides‟ perceived probability of getting the private property to be 
i(e
i, e
-i) where –i refers to the 
other group, the comparative static result becomes: 
 
   
        
 
           
           
            
                      
       
                                    (6) 
Given that SOC
-i-<0 it can be shown that |det|>0 and the final expression is positive if 
            
         
is  not  very large. That  is,  unless the political  equilibrium is  particularly  lopsided even  with 
strategic interaction among the types of claimants, an increase in the value of the land with 
private property rights will lead to an increase in the effort of that group. 
 